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This paper demonstrates results from a sample of 1168 randomly picked women from one of the 
leading microfinance institutions in Egypt: Tasaheel. This study tests whether microfinance helped 
women empowerment through increasing their income levels. The results show that loans increase 
women’s income on average. The sample shows that microfinance’s impact is unequal, helping the 
poor increase their revenue more. Socio-economic conditions affect the extent to which women 
benefit from the loans through their effect on the cost of debt. The cost of debt has a negative 
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The impact of Microfinance on Women Empowerment in the Egyptian Society 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
John Rawls once said “In all sectors of society there should be roughly equal prospects of culture 
and achievement for everyone similarly motivated and endowed. The expectations of those with the 
same abilities and aspirations should not be affected by their social class.” In reality, not everyone 
gets to have the same opportunities, which limits some of the most passionate and hardworking 
individuals from achieving success. Microfinance is a way to narrow this gap and help 
underprivileged individuals have access to financial services. Microfinance is a type of banking 
service offered to low-income, underserved individuals. It provides an opportunity for these 
entrepreneurs to have access to financial services since otherwise they would not be able to take 
loans (Deutsche bank Research, 2007). It is regarded by the United Nations as an important factor 
for Millennium Development Goals and decreasing poverty, famine and gender inequality by 2015 
(INAFI (2015), Hermes & Lensink, 2007). Microfinance has been introduced to the Egyptian 
market in the 1980s, since then, the microfinance industry has seen tremendous growth in Egypt. 
The number of microfinance institutions (MFIs) and NGOs is growing exponentially to meet the 
demand (FRA reports, check appendix 2, graph 1). In the current socio-economic conditions, 
women’s roles are often marginalized, and it is believed that their job is limited to their household. 
The opportunity that the microfinance industry provides encourages women to pursue their dreams 
and gain independence in a society that praises men. In this context, microfinance is a way to offer 
more opportunities to women and empower them. Women empowerment is the idea of women 
being able to challenge the society and culture they are living in (Swaina & Wallentin, 2009). This 
thesis will analyze the impact of microfinance on women empowerment in the Egyptian society. 
The analysis will be made through a case study of Tasaheel; an Egyptian microfinance company 
with more than 70% of its borrowers being women. This paper conducts an empirical research on 
the impact of such an important source of income in a country where poverty is very high (32.5% 
in 2018, according to the World Bank).  
The second chapter of this thesis starts by explaining what microfinance is. The chapter also gives 
a more elaborate perspective of women empowerment in Egypt. The second chapter also covers an 
overview of the literature on this topic and the theoretical framework. The third chapter explains 
the variables and describes the data. The last chapter illustrates the results and contains the 
conclusion that will summarize the main concepts and findings of this paper. 
 
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
2.1. Microfinance 
In Egypt, the microfinance landscape is regulated by the Financial Regulatory Authority (FRA). 
According to the FRA, microfinance helps increase economic productivity, reduce unemployment, 
improve income for the poorer tranche of society, encourage micro-entrepreneurs and decrease the 
financial gap in the sector (FRA website). According to the Egyptian law, microfinance companies 
cannot act as commercial banks and accept deposits, it only helps entrepreneurs whether it is 
through lending, leasing, Murabaha (islamic finance) or trading.  The size of lending is capped at 
EGP100,000 (€ c.5,600) by the FRA. The funds are used in various activities in all sectors: 
manufacturing, agricultural, tertiary and commercial. There are two main types of lending: 
individual lending and group lending. The group is typically composed of up to five women with 
different and independent projects. Default rates are typically low for MFIs (Banerjee, 2013), 
which indicates that borrowers are willing and able to pay (Buckley, 1997) and that the screening 
process is efficient (For Tasaheel default rates are lower than 2%). 
 
2.1.1. Difference between Microfinance and Commercial Loans 
Unlike commercial banks, MFIs do not ask for a physical collateral since their target market cannot 
provide it in most cases. To compensate for the high risk that they face, MFIs tend to charge high 
interest rates (Tasaheel was charging an effective interest rate between 40% and 52% on average 
in 2019, depending on the type of loan and the case). Interest rates reach over 100% per annum in 
some countries like Mexico (Banerjee, 2013). These interest rates also cover the high costs of 
investigating the borrower’s status, reputation and ability to pay (Banerjee, 2013). For borrowers, 
this is not their biggest concern since they get money that otherwise they wouldn’t have access to, 
and their return outweighs their cost of debt. Due to the high risk they face, MFIs give only short-
term loans (for Tasaheel in 2019 the average tenor was 14 months for individual loans and 19 
months for Group loans). On the other hand, commercial banks give long term loans and offer 
bigger amounts. Borrowers focus on the speed with which they get their money from the MFI (in 
Tasaheel’s case it is up to 72 hours) rather than traditional banks that can take months to decide on 
their due diligence process. The due diligence process is costly, which makes lending small 
amounts to the unbanked population unprofitable to financial institutions. By law, MFIs in Egypt 
only lend to microentrepreneurs whereas financial institutions can give out loans for personal 
consumption or to bigger and more established entrepreneurs and companies. This also underlines 
the difference in amounts typically lent by a bank as opposed to MFIs.  
2.1.1.1 Benefits of Group Lending  
Group lending is another aspect that differentiates MFIs from traditional banks. It is important to 
understand the benefits of it in order to understand the reason MFIs offer such a service. In Egypt, 
21.37% of the money disbursed by MFIs goes to group lending (FRA, 2Q19). In group lending, 
the loan is given to all the group members, which makes them all jointly liable. In the case of 
default by one of the group members, other members are responsible for paying the whole amount 
(Banerjee, 2013).  It is necessary that each member of the group has their own project to avoid 
collusion and decrease the risk of default, which is an important condition for Tasaheel’s group 
lending and was also the case in Banerjee et al. (1994). According to Hermes and Lensink (2007), 
the main benefit of the joint liability is the reduction of information asymmetries since the fear of 
default will push group members to screen each other thoroughly to reduce the risk of having to 
pay for them and monitor each other after taking the loan. The group, therefore, plays an insurance 
role decreasing agency costs for the lender and controlling for moral hazard. This will push 
members to work hard to be able to pay back their loan (Arnott & Stiglitz, 1990).   
  2.1.2. Growth of Microfinance in Egypt 
In the third quarter of 2019 (3Q19), the microfinance industry in Egypt was serving more than 3 
million individuals compared to 1.9 million in 3Q16. This means that the client base increases by 
a CAGR of 16.3%. (FRA report, 2Q19). Nearly half of the microfinance market are women [49.2% 
in 3Q19] seeking to grow their businesses, paving their way to independence.   
2.2. Women empowerment in Egypt 
“Egypt ranks low in gender equity compared to other countries worldwide.” (USAID, 2019). 
Women empowerment has been an issue in Egypt for decades. Several NGOs and institutions are 
raising awareness however, the problem does not seem to disappear. The Egyptian society still 
praises men and gender equality is not yet established. According to USAID (2019), women have 
lower participation rates than men in the labor force (26% vs 79%) and a lower literacy rates (65% 
literacy for women vs 82% of males). Women empowerment’s definition is a subjective matter. 
According to the European institute for gender equality, women empowerment can be broken into 
five components: self-worth, the right to make their own choices, access to opportunities and 
resources ability to take control of their own lives and social and financial independence.  
 
2.3. Previous studies 
2.3.1. Microfinance Empowering Women 
Several studies established that microfinance strengthened women’s position socially and 
financially. The Indian market has been the focus of many authors in this field since it is one of the 
emerging markets where microfinance is growing exponentially. Swaina and Wallentin (2009), 
studied a sample of 1000 households, amongst which is a control group. The purpose of the 
research was to examine the contribution of the microfinance institution SHG to women 
empowerment. The paper measured women empowerment through qualitative metrics by 
surveying women about their status, their participation in the labor market, domestic abuse and 
other questions concerning the challenges women go through to fight the norms they live in. By 
comparing the results of the treatment group to the control group, they found a significant effect of 
microfinance in empowering women, however, women experienced different degrees of change. 
The authors added that the difference in the degree of change comes from other factors than 
microfinance, which should be considered when testing for women empowerment. 
A study conducted by Khan & Noreen (2011) on the Pakistani district Bahawalpur showed that 
microfinance had a bigger impact on women than men. The paper states that microfinance 
opportunities provide women with a chance to escape gender inequality and domestic abuse. 
2.3.2. Microfinance is not Enough on its Own 
A research done on South Asia shows that microfinance does contribute to empowering women’s 
financial positions. However, the authors believe that there is more to women empowerment than 
financial independence, that the core change must be in the patriarchal power. The paper does not 
deny that financial independence can help women move towards a more powerful position in 
society. Nevertheless, it states that even if microfinance contributes to women’s development, it is 
not the “magic bullet” to empower them and that there are other political and social necessities for 
women to have a better position in the society (Kabeer, 2005). 
2.3.3. Microfinance, a Two-Sided Sword 
A study on the Tanzanian market, where poverty, women empowerment and inequality are big 
issues, showed that women who take loans from MFIs tend to have higher self-esteem, better in 
decision making and have greater self-efficacy. The study shows that MFIs focus on women and 
their empowerment through financial stability. However, the research underlines that microfinance 
can also have a negative impact on women. The paper highlights that high interest rates that can 
affect the borrower’s income and lead to women running away from their villages to escape from 
repayment or their assets being taken away. They also state that some of these loans are controlled 
by a man (husband for instance) leading to domestic violence (Kato & Kratzer, 2013).  
2.3.4. Microfinance, a Trap? 
A study on the Bangladeshi market states that as poverty was arising, microfinance was considered 
the only way to survive and the only coping mechanism (Shillabeer, 2008). MFIs helped poorer 
individuals to work in non-seasonal fields with stable incomes, such as poultry or cow rearing. This 
sort of income helped people increase their revenue, savings and access to education or healthcare. 
The author states that due to natural disasters that Bangladesh is continuously exposed to, every 
business and household gets affected. MFIs created an even bigger issue; over-indebtedness, which 
could lead to a poverty trap (Shillabeer, 2008). This example shows that microfinance is not 
necessarily the perfect fit to every market and its effect is not the same on every population.  
2.3.5 Microfinance has No Significant Effect on Borrowers 
Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster and Kinnan (2014) examine the effect of group lending on borrowers 
through their consumption, business creation, income and other sources during a 3-year study in 
India. The results suggest that microfinance did not significantly increase consumption or 
businesses profitability, however, it impacted households’ consumption choices (giving up 
“temptation goods” and investing in durable goods instead) and encouraged households to work 
harder on their projects. The research concludes that microfinance did not prove to be a miracle to 
escape poverty and has no effect on women empowerment or social outcomes.  
   2.3.6 Microfinance and Asymmetry of Information 
Moral hazard and adverse selection are two obstacles arising from the asymmetry of information 
between the lender and the borrower. The borrower tends to know more than the lender about his 
own risk appetite and ability to repay. In an ideal scenario, lenders would charge each borrower 
according to their risk type, the riskier the borrower, the higher the interest rate. However, not all 
information is disclosed and can be hidden. High risk individuals will pretend to be low risk 
(Banerjee, 2013), especially that MFIs tend to have a very quick screening process. To mitigate the 
problem, MFIs would want to avoid the risk of mis-judgement and charge one interest rate for all. 
In this case, they would choose to charge high interest rates since lower rates would result in a loss 
(Stiglitz & Weiss (1981), Akerlof (1970)). Consequently, as a result of adverse selection, risk 
averse borrowers find the cost of debt very high. Risk averse borrowers expose their businesses to 
minimal risk, which tends to result in lower revenues. By charging all borrowers high interest rates, 
MFIs increase the difficulty for these borrowers to fully repay their debt. Therefore, this could 
potentially decrease the overall collection rate (Banerjee, 2013).  
Asymmetry of information also arises as a result of hidden actions. In some cases, moral hazard 
could push the borrower to change his actions after guaranteeing to take the loan or voluntarily 
default on the loan (Banerjee, 2013). 
Behavioral biases can stop women from efficiently using the money they get from MFIs. These 
limitations can influence the extent to which microfinance can impact women’s lives.  
 
2.3.7. Microfinance’s Impact in Egypt 
There is a range of literature focusing on the different aspects of the impact of microfinance in 
Egypt. Barsoum (2006) underlined the gender biased approach in the microfinance sector by 
showing the interest of MFIs in lending Egyptian women more than men. An analysis by Nisser 
and Ayedh (2017) explained the need of microfinance to focus on women since it can lead to their 
empowerment. Through a literature review, Nisser and Ayedh (2017) demonstrated the impact of 
microfinance lending in other countries (India, Pakistan, Oman, Nigeria and Malaysia) and 
concluded that it would have a similar impact on Egyptian women. 
Nader (2008) and Drolet (2010) conducted research studying the impact of microfinance on 
Egyptian women’s socio-economic conditions. The authors found a positive impact of microcredits 
on income and self-confidence. Nevertheless, due to the limited resources, both papers conducted 
the research on samples where the treatment group was of less than 100 women.   
This thesis will add to the literature by analyzing a bigger sample from one of the leading MFIs in 
the market and provide a new perspective and an updated view on the impact of microfinance on 
women empowerment in Egypt. 
2.4. This Paper 
The aforementioned studies argue that microfinance on its own is not enough to empower women. 
The social, cultural and financial conditions are crucial for women’s status change in society. 
Nevertheless, financial stability is a step closer to independence and empowerment. If women use 
their funds in an efficient way, it can help them escape poverty and the loans will help their 
businesses and revenue increase even after they stop taking credits (Banerjee, Breza, Duflo, 
Kinnam, 2019). This thesis will test the following hypotheses: 
H1: Microfinance opportunities increase women’s income in Egypt 
This hypothesis will serve to test the extent to which microfinance ameliorates a woman’s financial 
position.  
H2: Microfinance benefits women unequally depending on personal characteristics 
This hypothesis helps see which type of women benefit most from microfinance when considering 
different cultural and social effects. 
 
Chapter 3: Data and Methodology 
3.1. Sample 
The hypotheses will be tested through a sample of 1168 women randomly picked from Tasaheel’s 
database. Tasaheel is the second biggest microfinance company in Egypt with a market share of 
17% (in 2Q19). The sample is composed of women who took several individual loans. In this study, 
mainly quantitative metrics are going to be used. All data is obtained through Tasaheel’s database. 
Any qualitative information given and used in this paper is admitted by the woman in question and 
is trusted to be true. The reason why a survey format is believed not to be suitable for this study is 
that some women could refrain from admitting a lot of their issues, which would bias results. 
3.2. Data & Methodology 
3.2.1. Regression Model 
In order to test for the hypothesis mentioned above a cross-sectional regression model is built on 
the Stata statistical tool. In this paper, a significance of 5% is used to decide on coefficients’ 
statistical significance, 5% is considered the conventional significance indicator (Brooks, 2014).   
 3.2.2 Variables  
Since women empowerment cannot be measured through one variable and is a debatable and 
subjective topic, for the purpose of this paper income will be taken as a proxy for a woman’s power 
and autonomy.  
The variable of interest is the logarithmic scale of the change in income. In this research, the income 
is taken from an indicator that the loan officers provide during their investigations and field visits 
to the project she has. The change in average income is calculated by dividing the income indicator 
of the women before her last loan by the income indicator before her first loan. The logarithmic 
scale helps interpreting the coefficients easier: as a percentage change and showing a linear 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables (Brooks, 2014). We are interested 
in the percentage change in income not the monetary value.  
There are several variables that can affect a woman’s income. First variable is the loan cycle, which 
indicates how many loans each woman has taken from the company. This variable illustrates 
whether taking more loans help women grow their income. One of the other indicators of the 
contribution of microfinance is the loan size. The average loan size is calculated by taking the 
average of all loans that a woman took. This variable shows whether the size of the loan affects the 
growth in women’s income. The logarithmic scale of the average loan size is taken to observe the 
change and not the absolute monetary value. Additionally, the logarithmic scale of the indicator of 
the initial level of income is added to put things into perspective since different women start from 
different income levels and project maturities. The average interest rate that each woman has been 
charged is used in this regression to see whether it cancels out the positive effect of microfinance 
on income, such as Shillabeer (2008) suggested.  
Another factor that is believed to affect a woman’s income is her family size, it will help see 
whether the size of the family that the woman takes care of affects her motives and encourages her 
to try to increase her income. The marital status of a woman is also believed to affect her needs and 
ability to expand her business. Marital status will be presented through a dummy variable. In poorer 
areas of Egypt, if a woman is married it is less likely that her husband will let her work (Hendy, 
2015). In such a culture normally, the man is the head of the house and the women takes care of 
household duties (EgyptIndependent, Cultural Atlas). Literacy is also an important variable since 
it influences efficiency and a person’s ability to work in certain fields or fulfill certain tasks on 
their own. Literacy will be presented as a dummy variable. A literate woman is normally more 
likely to be able to generate a higher income and have better economic and management skills, 
which could increase her productivity (UNICEF, 2006). Additionally, another variable used is 
urbanization, it will also be presented by a dummy variable. Urban areas tend to be more developed, 
hence, more open to the idea of a working woman. Robaa & Hafez (2002) talked about the 
constantly increasing urbanization in Cairo as opposed to other cities. For the purpose of this study, 
we will consider Cairo as the urban area and other areas will be considered as non-urban. The last 
variable is a dummy to show whether the woman of interest is the main earner of the house. If she 
is, she is more likely to work hard for better living conditions. 
 3.2.3 Descriptive Statistics 
This section will serve to describe the data before running any tests. It is important to note the 
number of observations can vary from one variable to the other since some women did not disclose 
all the information needed when asked. Firstly, the population characteristics are described: 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Socio-economic Characteristics of the Sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Urban 1168 0.485 0.500 0 1 
Marital Status 1168 0.729 0.445 0 1 
Main Earner 1168 0.419 0.494 0 1 
Literate 967 0.394 0.489 0 1 
Family Size 1039 3.638 1.392 0 9 
 
For all dummy variables the mean shows whether the majority has a variable of 0 or 1. The table 
above shows that 48.5% of the women in the sample are urban, 72.9% are married, 39.4% are 
literate and 41.9% are main earners. These statistics show that the sample is representative of the 
Egyptian culture, where women are mostly perceived as dependent. The average family size is 3 
to 4 people, which is considered high and makes it harder to maintain a good social standard or to 
make sure that children get a good quality education. These numbers show that it is a vicious circle, 
that it is hard to get out of poverty and illiteracy in such a culture. The culture on the one hand 
encourages big families, on the other hand discourages women from being independent and helping 
their children getting educated and have better lives (UNFPA Egypt, 2016) 
Secondly, the table below illustrates some statistics to see the women’s status in the company. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Women Status in Tasaheel 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Loan Cycle 1168 3.02 0.97 2 6 
Years Difference 1164 2.00 0.92 0.6 4.1 
Average Loan Size  1164 4017.83 776.90 1250 8000 
Average Interest  1163 52.76% 1.40% 48.67% 54.00% 
 
All the women in the sample are at least in their second loan cycle (have taken a minimum of two 
loans from Tasaheel). Table 2 shows that on average, women are in their third loan cycle, with a 
maximum of 6 loans. The time interval between one loan and another can differ from one woman 
to another, the variable years difference shows how many years have passed between the first and 
last loan. The average is 2 years, with a minimum of 0.6 year and a maximum of 4 years. The 
average loan size is EGP4,018 (equivalent to € c.225), which is equivalent to 2 times the minimum 
wage in Egypt. Today the minimum wage is EGP2,000 (equivalent to € c.112) (Reuters, 2019). 
Borrowers are charged an average interest rate of 52.76% (effective rate), which translates into an 




Chapter 4: Results and Conclusion 
In order to test the first hypothesis, different regressions are run to see whether women’s incomes 
increase with the help of microfinance. By testing the correlation between the average loan size 
and the change in income, the regression shows that when the average loan size increases by 1%, 
the income level increases by 1.01% (See Appendix 1, regression 1.1). This suggests that a bigger 
loan helps women grow their income more since it provides them with more resources.  
(1) Log Change in Income Indicator = α + 𝛽1 Log Average Loan Size + 𝛽2 Average Interest 
Rate + ε 
    Number of Obs 1157 
    F(2, 1154) 538.81 
     Prob > F 0.0000 
    R-Squared 0.4981 
    Root MSE  0.24869 
    Adjusted R-Squared 0.49723 
       





t P > |t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Log Average Loan 
Size 
0.8901 0.0409 21.75 0.000 0.8098 0.9704 
Average Interest 
Rate  
-11.2104 0.6064 -18.49 0.000 -12.4000 -10.0207 
Constant -0.7478 0.5206 -1.44 0.151 -1.7690 0.2736 
 
When interest rate is added to this regression, table 1 shows that the effect of average loan size 
decreases to 0.89%. This shows that an increase of 1% in the amount given as a loan is reflected in 
an increase of 0.89% in income levels. The regression also illustrates that interest rates impact 
change in income negatively. Keeping the loan size constant, when the interest rate increases by 
1%, the change in income decreases by 11.21%. These results confirm that higher interest rates 
decrease the effect that microfinance has on income. Therefore, high interest rates could potentially 
defeat microfinance’s purpose of helping women (which underlines Kato & Kratzer (2013)’s 
conclusion) and can possibly make repayment less likely (Banerjee, 2013).  
Adding the loan cycle variable to the regression will help us show whether the number of loans 
taken affect the increase in income.  
(2) Log Change in Income Indicator = α + 𝛽1 Log Average Loan Size + 𝛽2 Average Interest 
Rate +𝛽3 Loan Cycle + ε 
    Number of Obs 1157 
    F(3, 1153) 452.14 
     Prob > F 0.000 
    R-Squared 0.5559 
    Root MSE  0.23404 
    Adjusted R-Squared 0.5547 
       





t P > |t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Log Average Loan 
Size 
0.5939 0.0521 11.39 0.000 0.4916 0.6963 
Average Interest  -5.4205 0.7231 -7.50 0.000 -6.8391 -4.0018 
Loan Cycle 0.1392 0.0140 9.97 0.000 0.1118 0.1666 
Constant -1.7700 0.4330 -4.09 0.000 -2.6196 -0.9204 
 
 
Adding the variable loan cycle to the model decreases the coefficients for both: average loan size 
and average interest. This model has a bigger adjusted 𝑅2 (0.55 versus 0.50 for the last model) 
suggesting that it explains more of the variation in change in income. When the loan cycle is 
controlled for, its effect is no longer omitted or biasing other coefficients. The coefficient of 
average loan size decreases due to the positive correlation between loan cycle and average loan 
size that was previously presented as a coefficient for average loan size only (See Appendix 1, 
Table A1). In this model, the increase in 1% in the average loan increases the income levels by 
0.59%. On the other hand, keeping constant the loan size and interest, each additional loan the 
woman takes increases her change in income by 13.92%. This suggests that when a woman takes 
more loans, her ability to learn and use the funds efficiently increases, which leads her to increase 
her revenue. The model, therefore, shows that the loan cycle has a more significant effect than the 
loan size on income, ceteris paribus. The effect of the loan cycle could be due to a selection bias; 
only women with good projects would be able to renew and take more loans, therefore, increase 
their income further. The women whose businesses fail are not observed in the sample since they 
would not be able to take more loans, therefore the sample is biased towards women whose 
businesses succeed, enabling them to have a higher number of loans. Nevertheless, all the 
borrowers in the sample are still active and the sample contains businesses of different types and 
stages. All projects in the sample could potentially succeed or fail.  
Controlling for the loan cycle decreased the effect of interest rates on change in income. This 
changed from the last model since when the loan cycle variable is not controlled for, the model 
considered that all loan cycles are pooled. The change in coefficient is a result of the negative 
correlation between loan cycle and the interest rate charged. A first-time borrower is considered by 
the MFI as riskier than a woman who is taking her 6th loan for instance. The asymmetry of 
information is higher for a first-time borrower. Therefore, this would be reflected on the interest 
rate charged. The model shows that when interest rate increases by 1%, the change in income 
decreases by 5.42%. Two borrowers in the same loan cycle can be charged different interests based 
on the riskiness of their project, paying higher interest rates decreases the change in income levels. 
Another angle to test the change in income would be by looking into the effect the initial level of 
income of the individual has on their growth in revenue 
(3) Log Change in Income Indicator = α + 𝛽1 Log Initial Level of Income Indicator + ε 
    Number of Obs 1162 
    F(1, 1160) 766.35 
    Prob > F 0.0000 
    R-Squared 0.3865 
    Root MSE  0.27462 
    Adjusted R-Squared 0.38602 
       





t P > |t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Log Initial Level of 
Income Indicator 
-0.8692 0.0314 -27.68 0.000 -0.9308 -0.8076 
Constant 5.0150 0.1568 31.99 0.000 4.7074 5.3226 
 
Regression (3) shows that when the initial income increases by 1%, the change in income decreases 
by 0.86%, which means that income still increases but by a lower rate. In this context, income 
increases unequally; those who started off with a lower income see a higher increase in their 
revenues. The results indicate that microfinance reduces inequality, in the sample microfinance 
helps poor women more than richer ones. This suggests that the impact of microfinance does not 
lie on a woman’s income before taking the loan but on the effort and efficiency invested to increase 
revenue. Nonetheless, the initial revenue level could still affect the borrower through the amount 
she is guaranteed by the MFI. Regression (4) shows that when the initial income level increases by 
1%, the average loan size increases by 0.19%. The higher revenue gives the MFI more security that 
the woman will be able to repay her debt. This suggests that initial income could still affect the 
change in income through its effect on loan size.  
(4) Log Average Loan Size = α + 𝛽1 Log Initial Level of Income Indicator + ε 
    Number of Obs 1164 
    F(1, 1162) 71.26 
    Prob > F 0.0000 
    R-Squared 0.0578 
    Root MSE  0.19086 
    Adjusted R-Squared 0.057034 
       





t P > |t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Log Initial Level of 
Income Indicator 
0.1887 0.0224 8.44 0.000 0.1448 0.2326 
Constant 7.3541 0.1118 65.68 0.000 7.1257 7.5645 
 
When contrasting the regressions (3) and (4), it seems that in this sample poor women get smaller 
loans, but they make better use of funds resulting in a bigger change in income than women starting 
with higher incomes. 
In order to test the second hypothesis, the following regression is run 
(5) Log Change in Income Indicator = α + 𝛽1 Family Size + 𝛽2 Literate +𝛽3 Main Earner +𝛽4 
Marital Status + 𝛽5 Urban + ε 
    Number of Obs 875 
    F(5, 869) 24.75 
     Prob > F 0.0000 
    R-Squared 0.1263 
    Root MSE  0.32166 
    Adjusted R-Squared 0.1213 
       





t P > |t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Family Size -0.0127 0.0077 -1.65 0.100 -0.0278 0.0024 
Literate 0.0175 0.0245 0.71 0.475 -0.0306 0.0657 
Main Earner 0.0351 0.0255 1.37 0.170 -0.0150 0.0851 
Marital Status -0.0206 0.0284 -0.73 0.468 -0.0764 0.0351 
Urban 0.2328 0.0251 9.28 0.000 0.1836 0.2820 
Constant 0.6380 0.0440 14.50 0.000 0.5516 0.7244 
 
The table illustrates that the only statistically significant variable is urban, the coefficient of 0.23 
suggests that when a woman is urban her income level should increase by 23.28% more than a non-
urban woman, ceteris paribus. The results reflect the advancement of an urban woman vis a vis 
non-urban woman. Living in the capital gives more exposure that can help women learn how to 
grow their business efficiently and it provides women with more opportunities. Therefore, an urban 
woman can be more ambitious and driven due to her environment. Additionally, urban women 
have a bigger market to target, which could help in increasing their revenue. On the other hand, 
another interpretation would be that the women who choose to live in or migrate to the city are 
different and more driven. If the latter case is true, it would suggest that there could be a selection 
bias. The model shows that the family size affects the change in income negatively, that every 
additional person in the family decreases the change in income by 1.27%. This can be explained 
by the fact that bigger families require more money, and this gives less space to the borrower to 
invest back in her business. When the woman is literate the income changes by 1.75% more than 
an illiterate woman. The increase in growth can come from the difference in efficiency between a 
literate and an illiterate woman. For instance, a literate woman can be more productive, take less 
time to acquire certain skills or take on more tasks and require less manpower. The regression 
suggests that a main earner can increase her income by 3.51% more than a woman who is not in 
charge of the house expenses alone. This can be explained by the motives of a main earner that 
drive her to work longer hours, learn more and increase efficiency to be able to sustain her family. 
On the other hand, a married woman’s income changes by 2.06% less than a single woman. This 
can also be explained by the need of a single woman to sustain herself and her family, whereas a 
married woman could have her husband’s support and choose to spend less time working. It can 
also be a result of cultural pressure, where the husband is the one who makes use of the money, 
such as Kato & Kratzer (2013) suggested. Another reason could be that the husband does not 
encourage her work enough to be able to take care of her household duties, which will not let her 
increase her income significantly.  
It is important to note that the results of this model are only statistically significant for the variable 
urban. The interpretation of the other coefficient cannot be considered very reliable since they are 
not statistically significant. The correlation matrix in appendix 1 table A2 confirms the signs of the 
coefficients in regression 5. This shows that the correlations exist, however, we cannot rely on the 
coefficients of any of the statistically insignificant variables in the regression.  
Appendix 1 illustrates the regression of the logarithmic scale of change in income levels on each 
of the independent variables in regression (5) individually. All regressions show statistically 
significant coefficients. Regression (1.2) suggests that when a family increases by one person, the 
change in income decreases by 2.53%. Regression (1.3) shows that a literate woman’s income 
changes by 9.15% more than an illiterate woman. Regression (1.4) proposes that a main earner 
grows her income by 8.01% more than a woman who partially participates in household’s income 
or works for other purposes. Regression (1.5) indicates that a married woman’s income growth by 
1.31% than an unmarried woman, however, the coefficient is statistically insignificant and the 
adjusted 𝑅2  is negative. This suggests that marital status does not explain the variations in change 
in income levels. Regression (1.6) shows that an urban woman grows her income by 25.80% more 
than a rural borrower. These results confirm the signs of the coefficients in regression 5, however, 
since in these regressions no control variables are included, they are prone to omitted variable 
biases.  
In order to see whether the MFI’s pricing changes based on the woman’s status, a regression on 
the interest rate is run. 
(6) Average Interest Rate = α + 𝛽1 Family Size + 𝛽2 Literate +𝛽3 Main Earner +𝛽4 Marital 
Status + 𝛽5 Urban + ε  
    Number of Obs 877 
    F(5, 871) 36.95 
     Prob > F 0.0000 
    R-Squared 0.1548 
    Root MSE  0.01252 
    Adjusted R-Squared 0.1500 






t P > |t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Family Size 0.0013 0.0003 4.37 0.000 0.0007 0.0019 
Literate -0.0025 0.0010 -2.43 0.015 -0.0045 -0.0005 
Main Earner -0.0048 0.0011 -4.35 0.000 -0.0070 -0.0026 
Marital Status 0.0025 0.0012 2.05 0.041 0.0001 0.0050 
Urban -0.0057 0.0010 -5.48 0.000 -0.0077 -0.0036 
Constant 0.5265 0.0017 305.88 0.000 0.5231 0.5299 
 
The model shows that all variables are significant in the explanation of the pricing for each 
borrower. The model explains 15% (adjusted 𝑅2) of the variation in interest rates. The family size 
has a positive coefficient. When the family size increases by 1 person, the interest rate increases 
by 0.13%. This can be a result of the riskiness of the borrower that increases when the woman has 
more of expenses that can distract her from growing her income, hence, makes repayment harder. 
Additionally, a woman with a bigger family is more likely to have less time to work and can be 
perceived as less committed. When a woman is literate, she is likely charged a 0.25% lower interest 
rate than an illiterate woman. An illiterate woman can be considered riskier since there is less proof 
of hard work and skills than a woman who has a certain degree, since these degrees could be used 
as a signal for hard work. The model shows that a main earner is charged a lower interest rate than 
a woman who is not responsible for household expenses, she is charged 0.48% less. This can be 
explained by the pressure a main earner feels to increase her income, which leads her to show more 
commitment to her job. A married woman is charged 0.25% more than a single woman, an 
assumption for this pricing can be that in the observed sample are subject to cultural restrictions 
where a married woman is asked to focus more on the household duties and less on her job, making 
her a riskier borrower. The model shows that an urban woman is less risky than a non-urban woman 
and is charged 0.57% less. This can be explained by the advancement of skills of women in urban 
areas making them less risky.  
It is important to note that correlation does not imply causation. These results reflect the case of 
this sample, but it does not imply that these factors are the real reasons behind the interest rate 
pricing. A major factor that affects interest rates is market pricing and competition. This model 
does not include data on other MFIs, but the interest rates they charge affect Tasaheel’s pricing. 
The average loan size is an indicator that could be used as a proxy to see whether MFIs provide all 
women with the same opportunities. 
(7) Log Average Loan Size = α + 𝛽1 Family Size + 𝛽2 Literate +𝛽3 Main Earner +𝛽4 Marital 
Status + 𝛽5 Urban + ε 
    Number of Obs 876 
    F(5, 870) 2.73 
     Prob > F 0.0188 
    R-Squared 0.0139 
    Root MSE  0.19342 
    Adjusted R-Squared 0.0082 
       





t P > |t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Family Size 0.0023 0.0047 0.49 0.621 -0.0069 0.0116 
Literate -0.0275 0.0152 -1.81 0.071 -0.0574 0.0024 
Main Earner -0.0124 0.0157 -0.79 0.427 -0.0432 0.0183 
Marital Status 0.0110 0.0179 0.62 0.538 -0.2415 0.0463 
Urban -0.0212 0.0156 -1.35 0.176 -0.0519 0.0095 
Constant 8.2939 0.0278 298.37 0.000 8.2394 8.3485 
 
The regression shows that the variables are all statistically insignificant, which means that the 
model is not representative of the variations in the average loan size. The adjusted 𝑅2  suggests 
that the model explains less than 1% of the variation in the average loan size. This could mean that 
there are other factors that affect the decision of an MFI to decide the amount given. The loan 
officers study the woman’s business, her current revenue and decide the loan size based on their 
analysis of the project (Tasaheel, 2019). This does not mean that a woman’s social conditions do 
not affect the size of the loan, however, causation cannot be implied since it is possible for two 
women with the same conditions to ask for different loan sizes according to their needs.  
 
The analysis conducted shows that for the sample being studied, on average, taking a microfinance 
loan has a positive impact on a woman’s income level. In this sample, microfinance helps poorer 
women more in growing their income. The results show that efficiency results in bigger change in 
income.  Therefore, we do not reject the first hypothesis. 
Socio-economic characteristics of a woman do impact MFIs’ pricing but do not impact the average 
loan size given. In the sample, interest rates increase with the characteristics and conditions which 
could increase risk or potentially lead a woman to default. These characteristics also affect the 
extent to which microfinance can help a woman’s income since some conditions limit a woman 
from working efficiently. Therefore, we do not reject the second hypothesis. 
4.2 Conclusion  
This study aims to test whether microfinance has an impact on women’s financial position through 
a sample from one of the market leading microfinance companies in Egypt: Tasaheel. The results 
of this sample show that microfinance does impact a woman's income positively through the loan 
size granted. The number of loans taken by a woman is shown to help her increase her income 
further. However, there is no conclusion drawn on the effect of the loan cycle since there could be 
a selection bias reflecting successful businesses only. Women with unsuccessful businesses would 
not be able to renew their loans and benefit from the suggested increase in income.  
The interest rates have a negative impact on income growth since it is a cost for the borrower. The 
cost of borrowing is likely to decrease with the amount of loans the woman takes. There are socio-
economic characteristics that affect the extent to which a woman is able to increase her revenue. 
Some of these characteristics make the woman a riskier borrower to the company, which increases 
her cost of debt. In this sample, the personal characteristics do not impact the amount of the loan. 
To be able to empower women and help them claim their position in the society, MFIs need to 
offer courses and programs to help their borrowers invest their money efficiently, especially the 
uneducated clients. Giving out money is not enough on its own. Incremental services will make the 
loans more useful, increase productivity and help change the perception of women in the society 
(Niner, 2018).  
It is important to note that theories are not always a perfect fit for every market, there can always 
be exceptions due to the culture or the market conditions that affect the actual results. 
4.2.1 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Studies 
There is more to women empowerment than financial stability. The results of this paper cannot be 
taken on their own as an indicator for women empowerment in Egypt. Futures studies can observe 
how a woman’s social status and decision-making power changed after taking a loan to see if it has 
a bigger contribution to empowerment than economic improvement. 
Households are heterogeneous, they differ in productivity and efficiency (Banerjee et al. 2019). 
This is reflected in their use of funds and will affect their ability to increase their returns, which 
limits the generalization of the results found.  
Another limitation to this study is that it is hard to control for fraud; a borrower can claim to have 
a project and hide information and use the means for personal consumption. In such a case it would 
be hard for them to increase their return and payback their loan. Such actions are hard to monitor, 
especially if it is an individual loan. 
Due to the time framework of this study, it was not possible to observe the sample before and after 
taking the loans from the MFI. Future studies could compare women’s status before and after the 
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Table A1: Correlation between Loan Cycle, Average Interest Rate and Average Loan Size  
  Loan Cycle Average Interest Rate Average Loan Size 
Loan Cycle 1.000    
Average Interest Rate -0.661 1.000   
Average Loan Size -0.511 -0.161 1.000 
 














1.000       
Family Size -0.062 1.000      
Literate 0.149 0.036 1.000     
Main Earner 0.129 -0.300 0.092 1.000    
Marital Status  -0.075 0.163 -0.063 -0.294 1.000   
Urban 0.341 0.046 0.374 -0.146 -0.074 1.000 
 
1.1.Log Change in Income Indicator = α + 𝛽1 Log Average Loan Size + ε 
    Number of Obs 1162 
    F(1, 1160) 479.49 
     Prob > F 0.0000 
    R-Squared 0.3034 
    Root MSE  0.29265 
    Adjusted R-Squared 0.3028 
       





t P > |t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Log Average Loan 
Size 
1.0116 0.0462 21.90 0.000 0.9209 1.1022 
Constant -7.6671 0.3806 -20.14 0.000 -8.4139 -6.9203 
 
1.2.Log Change in Income Indicator = α + 𝛽1 Family Size + ε 
    Number of Obs 1034 
    F(1, 1032) 10.64 
     Prob > F 0.0011 
    R-Squared 0.0099 
    Root MSE  0.35229 
    Adjusted R-Squared 0.0089 
       





t P > |t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Family Size -0.0253 0.0078 -3.26 0.001 -0.0405 -0.0101 
Constant 0.8091 0.0311 25.98 0.000 0.7480 0.8702 
 
1.3.Log Change in Income Indicator = α + 𝛽1 Literate + ε 
    Number of Obs 962 
    F(1, 960) 16.79 
     Prob > F 0.0000 
    R-Squared 0.0171 
    Root MSE  0.33984 
    Adjusted R-Squared 0.0160 
       





t P > |t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Literate 0.0915 0.0223 4.10 0.000 0.0477 0.1354 
Constant 0.6403 0.0142 45.16 0.000 0.6125 0.6681 
 
1.4.Log Change in Income Indicator = α + 𝛽1 Main Earner + ε 
    Number of Obs 1113 
    F(1, 1111) 14.13 
     Prob > F 0.0002 
    R-Squared 0.0127 
    Root MSE  0.34967 
    Adjusted R-Squared 0.0118 
       





t P > |t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Main Earner 0.0801 0.0213 3.76 0.000 0.3830 0.1219 
Constant 0.6764 0.0136 49.60 0.000 0.6496 0.7031 
 
1.5.Log Change in Income Indicator = α + 𝛽1 Marital Status + ε 
    Number of Obs 1162 
    F(1, 1160) 0.31 
     Prob > F 0.5753 
    R-Squared 0.0003 
    Root MSE  0.35058 
    Adjusted R-Squared -0.0005 
       





t P > |t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Marital Status -0.01306 0.0233 -0.56 0.575 -0.5878 0.0327 
Constant 0.7199 0.0200 36.04 0.000 0.6807 0.7591 
 
1.6.Log Change in Income Indicator = α + 𝛽1 Urban + ε 
    Number of Obs 1162 
    F(1, 1160) 181.12 
     Prob > F 0.0000 
    R-Squared 0.1355 
    Root MSE  0.32601 
    Adjusted R-Squared 0.1348 
       





t P > |t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Urban 0.2580 0.0192 13.46 0.000 0.2204 0.2957 
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